Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) pose a need for dynamically establishing a secret key joint to a group of nodes. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has emerged as a suitable public key cryptographic foundation for WSN. This paper adopts an ECCbased Diffie-Hellman (DH) self-certified key establishment methodologies for securing ad hoc clusters of sensor nodes. The results pertain to a novel load-balancing technique accompanied by a detailed communication protocol. Pairwise DH self-certified key-establishment procedures are extended to online group key generation. Linear computational complexity is observed with respect to the network size, yielding a highly scalable framework. Moreover, authentication is introduced as an inherent component in all key generation processes. Implementation results are presented for the TelosB sensor node platform, clearly demonstrating the viability of the proposed approach.
INTRODUCTION
Security is a growing concern in many wireless sensor network (WSN) applications [Chan et al. (2003) ; Perrig et al. (2004) ; Watro et al. (2004) ] where sensor nodes are deployed in hostile environments, prone to a wide variety of malicious attacks. Unfortunately, due to the many unique characteristics of the WSN, this security problem cannot be solved by direct application of traditional network security solutions.
In particular, the following security considerations and requirements need to be discussed in the context of WSNs. First, the ad-hoc nature and the extreme dynamic environment in which the sensor network resides suggest that a prerequisite for achieving security is the ability to encrypt and decrypt confidential data among an arbitrary set of sensor nodes. For the same reason, the keys used for encryption and decryption should be established at the nodes instead of using keys generated off-line, prior to deployment. This is important in order to accommodate adaptation with respect to the dynamics of the network, and accommodate for topology changes. If a communications channel is unavailable during a particular time frame, the protocol should be sufficiently adaptive so as to allow for progressive calculations to take place. The reliability of the links, which is closely related to the issue of channel dynamics, must be reflected by any WSN protocol such that erroneous links do not jeopardize the integrity of the key generation process.
Second, due to high node density, scalability is an inherent concern. Ad hoc formation of node clusters [Qi and Xu (2004) ; Qi et al. (2003) ], hosting collaborative processing, has been a solution in achieving both fault tolerance and scalability. Consequently, an ad-hoc cluster of nodes is required to establish a joint secret key, and any solid key generation scheme must scale with respect to the number of nodes in a cluster.
The third aspect pertains to the scarce energy resource, along with low computation capability, which are always primary concerns in security solutions for WSNs; there is clear need for conserving energy and reducing the computation load on each node, when adopting a security protocol for WSN.
A simple solution for key establishment is a single network-wide shared key. Unfortunately, a single node in the network being captured would easily reveal the network secret key. A current mainstream effort consists of random key pre-distribution [Chan (2004) ; Chan et al. (2003) ; Du et al. (2004 Du et al. ( , 2003 ; Ramkumar and Memon (2005) ; Zhang and Cao (2005) ], in which a different set of pre-established keys is issued to each node, thereby reducing the probability that capturing one node will jeopardize the entire network. A trivial key pre-distribution scheme is to allow each node to hold N −1 secret pairwise keys, each of which is known only to the node and to one of the other N − 1 nodes (assuming there are N nodes in the network). However, the constrained memory resources and the difficulty in adding new nodes to the network, limit the effectiveness of this general scheme.
Other researchers have extended the original notion of key pre-distribution to include a statistical element. In particular, methods such as those proposed in Eschenauer and Gligor (2002) assume that each sensor node receives a random subset of keys drawn from a large key pool. To agree on a key for communication, two nodes find one common key within their subsets and use that key as their shared secret key. Additional information, such as data concerning the position and/or geographical distribution of the sensor nodes, can be used to further improve the key pre-distribution concept [Du et al. (2004) ]. These schemes offer partial solution with respect to scalability, cryptographic robustness and the ability to append and revoke security attributes. For example, scalability is limited, since the probability of two or more nodes sharing a pre-distributed key drops rapidly as the number of nodes increases. This results in a need to communicate with other nodes in order to establish a joint secret key -a process that necessitates additional resources. The cryptographic robustness is also lacking, as reflected by two aspects: first, the static key rings assigned to the nodes do not allow for dynamic key generation, i.e. the generation of a new secret key per session, thereby reducing the cryptographic strength. Second, by capturing a node, an adversarial party may be able to decrypt data exchanges between other nodes in the network (given that the nodes utilize keys that are present in the captured node).
The problems identified in the key pre-distribution approach triggered an in-depth study of public key cryptographic key-establishment for WSN. A recent trend [Arazi et al. (2005) ; Malan et al. (2004); Wander et al. (2005) ], therefore, promotes the implementation of Diffie-Hellman (DH) key-establishment procedures as well as other publickey based schemes in WSNs. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [Menezes (1993) ] emerges as a suitable public key cryptographic foundation for sensor networks, providing high security for relatively small key sizes. Recent results [Malan et al. (2004) ] indicate that the execution of ECC operations in sensor nodes is feasible, with predictable improved performance.
This paper intends to further advance the feasibility of implementing ECC-based DH key-establishment in WSN, addressing inherent constraints pertaining to their limited processing, memory and power resources. A self-certified key generation approach is employed, enabling to effectively address the scalability, cryptographic robustness and flexibility attributes, all of which are vital in the context of WSN security solutions. The key generation methods address both pairwise and group key establishment. Special attention is given to expediting processing, while balancing power consumption, by offloading non-secure computation tasks to neighboring nodes. The proposed methodology reflects on a strict balance between communication and computation resources.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we outline the security considerations and requirements in WSN, along with a description of the unique attributes of self-certified public key establishment. Background on the latter is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes a load-balancing protocol for ad-hoc clusters of sensor nodes. Extensions to group-sharing of session keys are presented in section 5. Section 6 focuses on experimental results, while a discussion of future directions is presented in section 7.
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY IN WSN
Public key cryptographic applications are customarily based on one of two possible intractable mathematical problems: factorizing a large (e.g., 1024-bit) composite integer, or performing a discrete-log operation. A representative application that is based on the factorization complexity is the RSA [Rivest et al. (1983) ]. Applications that are based on the discrete log problem include Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). ECC is considered to provide the highest security per bit [Certicom (1997)] . A 163-bit ECC application provides the same security as a 1024-bit application over a composite integer. This attractive fea-ture of ECC makes it most suitable for WSN applications.
Two public key cryptographic key-establishment procedures are commonly recognized. A fixed key-establishment procedure relates to the case where two specific nodes generate the same secret value whenever they wish to establish a joint key. In ephemeral key-establishment, the two nodes generate a different key for each session established, based on a random component introduced by each node. Ephemeral key-establishment is more secure and is generally preferred in many applications. In order to increase security, it is highly desirable that a pair of nodes establishes a different joint key at each session.
A major issue in public key cryptographic applications concerns certification. The latter is a mechanism used for authentication of the public values submitted by the participants. Typically, this is facilitated by the use of a certificate, issued by a Certifying Authority/Agent (CA), attesting to the connection between a user's public key and his ID. Verifying the validity of a user's public key, that is, verifying that the public key is associated with the user's ID, is achieved in an implied manner that still needs an explicit reference to the CA's public key. An authentication procedure which is based on certification therefore needs the following values as input: the user's public key, his ID, the certificate and the CA's public key. The latter value is considered to be universal and known to all parties. The first three values are unique to each user.
In self-certified public key cryptographic applications [Girault (1991) ], a user submits its ID along with its public key, but does not submit an explicit certificate, thereby reducing communication and management overheads, which is a vital consideration in WSN. In identity-based systems [Fiat and Shamir (1987) ], the user's public key is its actual ID, which avoids the need for any public value other than the user's ID. Nevertheless, an explicit reference to the CA's public key is required. In the context of key generation, self certification would mean that the authenticity of values submitted by the participating parties is inherently established within the process of generating the session key. This is in contrast to the case of explicit certification, whereby authenticity of the submitted values has to be verified prior to the actual generation of the joint session key.
In this paper we present a comprehensive ECC-based self-certified ephemeral key establishment methodology, suitable for WSN environments. Furthermore, a method for generating a joint secret key between an ad-hoc cluster of nodes is described. Although group key establishment based on public key cryptography has been considered in the literature [Kim et al. (2004) ], there is no treatment of the issue of authentication. In fact, a common assumption made by these schemes is that an authentication mechanism is already available. The proposed method also concerns the efficient integration of self-certified authentications.
Finally, in an effort to effectively distribute the computational load between the nodes, we propose to partition the self-certified key-establishment process into secure and non-secure operations. This enables offloading the nonsecure operations from a node participating in the keyestablishment process to available neighboring nodes. Such distribution of the computational efforts yields improved load-balancing, shorter execution times and more homogeneous power consumption across the network.
BACKGROUND: AN ECC BASED SELF-CERTIFIED DH KEY-ESTABLISHMENT METHODOLOGY
The basic techniques introduced in this section are adopted from Arazi (1999) . The mathematical foundations rely on ECC cryptographic techniques pertaining to operations over a finite group of points in which the discrete log problem applies. Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange is a cryptographic protocol which allows two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel. This key can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher. Denote a "point" on an elliptic curve by a capital letter in bold font (e.g., P). Multiplication of a point by a scalar (e.g., s × P) is commonly referred to as an exponentiation, in which s is called the exponent. ECC operations are based on the existence of a generating point G, with an order ordG, which is known to all parties. The private and public keys are issued by the CA to all nodes in the network. The CA holds a pair of keys, a private key which is a scalar denoted by d, and a public key, which is a point denoted by R, where R = d × G. Let ID i denote the ID or any other relevant attributes of a node N i . The notation H(s, P) refers to a scalar obtained by hashing a scalar s and a point P. In general, the following framework applies to all key generation methodologies presented here. First, key-issuing takes place, whereby a node acquires off-line a set of public and private keys. Next, a joint key is established online via self-certified DH, followed by key confirmation.
Key-issuing Procedures
The CA issues to node N i a private key (x i ), and the public key (U i ) before the node is deployed. The key-issuing procedure is thus performed as follows:
1. The CA generates a random scalar h i 2. The CA then generates node N i 's public and private keys as follows:
3. The CA issues the values x i and U i to N i ; 4. N i can establish the validity of the values issued to it by checking whether
Self-certified Fixed Key-establishment
A self-certified DH fixed key-establishment is achieved by the following two steps: (1) N i and N j exchange the pairs (ID i , U i ) and (ID j , U j ), respectively, and (2) N i and N j generate the session-key,
Key confirmation should now follow, where N i and N j should encrypt and decrypt a test message, using their keys K ij and K ji , and verify that they actually share the same key. The two keys are expected to be identical, having the value x i × x j × G. Verifying, by an independent keyconfirmation procedure, that the keys generated by the two nodes are indeed equal, establishes their correct identities. This closes the trust loop controlled by the CA.
A primary contribution offered by this method of selfcertified fixed key establishment lies in the number of exponentiations needed to calculate the value x i × x j × G. As indicated above, the node
The value x i × R, which utilizes fixed values, can be pre-calculated and stored by N i . Therefore N i is able to calculate its session-key by the single online expo-
generating a certified key using only one exponentiation. In comparison, a standard fixed key establishment requires 3 online ECC exponentiations (two for validating a certificate and one for the key generation).
Self-certified Ephemeral Keyestablishment
A self-certified DH ephemeral key-establishment is achieved by the following steps: (1) N i and N j generate a random pv i and pv j , respectively, (2) N i calculates the ephemeral value EV i = pv i × G, while N j calculates the ephemeral value EV j = pv j ×G (performed prior to establishing the communication session between the two nodes), (3) N i and N j exchange the values (ID i , U i , EV i ) and (ID j , U j , EV j ), respectively, and (4) N i and N j generate the ephemeral session key,
As specified for the fixed-key case, key confirmation should now follow. That is, N i and N j should encrypt and decrypt a test message, using their keys K ij and K ji , and verify that they actually share the same key. The two keys are expected to be identical, having the value
Verifying that the keys generated
Cluster A Cluster B Figure 1 Illustration of two clusters established in accordance with a moving target. Nodes generating a key for the first time, will issue a fixed key. Other nodes will issue an ephemeral key.
by the two nodes are indeed equal, establishes their correct identities. Note that the calculations performed by N i and N j are
The pre-calculation and storage of x i × R (which is fixed for all key-establishment procedures in which N i participates) would enable N i to calculate its sessionkey by performing only two online exponentiations
This is preceded by the off-line calculation of EV i = pv i × G, performed for each session using a different pv i . The latter can be carried out at any stage prior to establishing a communication session with N j .
ADOPTING A LOAD-BALANCED KEY-ESTABLISHMENT PROCEDURE

Offloading of Computational Efforts to Neighboring Nodes
Offloading non-secure tasks from a component having limited resources to an assisting node is not new. This approach is used for example in RSA key generation [Arazi (1999) ] and in broadcast encryption [Boneh et al. (2000) ] various industrial products also treat the offloading of symmetric cryptographic operations. A model for load balancing GF (2 n ) arithmetic calculations is presented in Arazi (1999) . In this paper, the new approach to load-balancing among WSN motes, is based on manipulations with DiffieHellman key-establishment mathematics.
Both fixed-key and ephemeral-key establishments are treated here. Their suggested employment in WSN is illustrated in Figure 1 . As indicated before, ephemeral key establishment pertains to nodes appearing in more than one cluster. All other nodes generate a fixed group key. l In the interest of distributing the power consumption across the sensor network, we employ an offloading technique in which nodes assist other nodes by performing part of the required calculations. In the context of security operations, we must prove that calculations that are offloaded, and are subsequently transmitted over potentially eavesdrop-prone channels, do not jeopardize the trustworthiness of the process.
As shown in Section 3.3, the ad-hoc operations executed during the ephemeral key-establishment are [pv i × H(ID j , U j ) mod ordG] and (x i + pv i ) × (EV j + R). The first must be executed at the node N i as it contains the private ephemeral value pv i . Assisting neighboring nodes (not included in the ad hoc cluster, but with proximity to it) will calculate the value (x i + pv i ) × (EV j + R). It should be noted that all nodes are assumed to have knowledge of R. While x i and pv i are secret, their sum does not disclose their values. Moreover, even though x i is fixed, pv i never repeats itself. In other words, the secret key x i is masked with the random noise pv i . It is further noted that the neighboring assisting node is not necessarily trusted in delivering a correct answer. The assisting node merely performs mathematical processing and does not issue any decisions. An attempt to send a misleading result by an assisting node will be detected during the key confirmation step.
Communication Framework
The approach taken in this paper is that of exploiting spatial offloading of calculation tasks needed to establish a joint key between two nodes. Available nodes, not included in the current cluster, assist other nodes by concurrently performing portions of the necessary computations. Figure 2 illustrates a basic network topology in which nodes A and B wish to establish a joint ephemeral key, with the assistance of nodes C and D. The following protocol outlines the process by which a joint key is established between the two nodes:
1. A broadcasts a message to B, which includes a unique ID number, ID A , requesting to establish a joint key.
2. B replies with a confirmation broadcast message containing ID B . 7. The joint key is established, followed by key confirmation. l
A and B exchange (ID
The described offloading concept suggests that assisting nodes are self organized in the sense that there is no centralized entity pairing nodes. Therefore, a key question is how are assisting nodes identified. The proposed method relies on the use of a single weight value, w i , calculated at each node i, reflecting on its availability to assist. For example, the weight can be proportional to the remaining energy of the node. The larger the weight the higher the node's availability to assist. Let us assume node N i receives a request for assistance message, AST REQ, from a neighboring node, and its current weight is w i . Node N i then waits for exp(− w 2 i 2σ 2 ) amount of time to respond with an acknowledgement message, AST ACK. The standard deviation (σ) controls how fast the Gaussian function decreases with respect to the weight (w i ). If, during the waiting period, a different neighboring node, say N j , broadcasts an AST ACK message, N i will discard the AST REQ and N j is assumed to serve as the assisting node. However, if N i does not receive any AST ACK indicating assistance before the waiting time expires, N i will become the assisting node.
If the node that requests assistance does not receive any AST ACK within a certain amount of time, t wait , then this node will perform all calculations. Such scenario might occur when all neighboring nodes are at a low-energy level or the communication link has errors.
GROUP-KEY ESTABLISHMENT BASED ON PAIRWISE DH KEY ESTABLISHMENT
Formation of a Group Key
It is next shown how a group of m nodes generates a secret session key K s joint to all nodes in the group and not known to any party outside the group. In this respect it is noted that the self authentication of the DH keys is based on the identity, ID s , of the participants. These identity values can also be associated with attributes of nodes, rather than their explicit identities. For example, they can be associated with parameters that specify the meaning of the group. That is, nodes that do not posses appropriate parameters allowing them to participate in the group cannot force themselves into the group.
Let the nodes in the group be indexed in a chain, where node N i generates two DH keys, one jointly generated with node N i−1 and one with N i+1 , i = 0, 1, . . . , m−1. Although this is not a necessity, the indexing is cyclic. That is, N m−1 and N 0 also generate a joint key. For simplicity, let us further assume that m is even. These 2m DH keys can all be generated within two time slots. Let K i+ denote the DH key joint to nodes N i and N i+1 , generated during the first time slot for even i's, and K i− denote the DH keys generated during the second time slot for odd i's. This way, during each slot, every node is busy generating a joint DH key with exactly one other node.
Based on the fact that each node posses two DH keys, one joint to the preceding node in the chain and one joint to the subsequent node (where N m−1 and N 0 are considered to be consecutive), the secret session key K s , joint to all members in the group, is then generated as follows. A certain node N j in the group (N j can be an arbitrary node, or a node with some distinct preferences such as the cluster head or group leader) generates a random K s . It encrypts K s with K j+ and sends the ciphertext to N j+1 . Node N j+1 decrypts the ciphertext, as it also has K j+ , thereby recovering K s . It then encrypts K s with the DH key joint to N j+1 and N j+2 , etc. This way, K s securely propagates in the chain, by decryption and encryption operations taking place at each node. K s finally gets back to the originator N j , who verifies that the received K s is identical to the original.
Although calculations are carried out concurrently by the odd and even nodes, we must consider the fact that transmission of information is done sequentially, since the same media is shared by all nodes. Letting t access and t x denote the expected channel access time and transmission/reception times, respectively, the aggregate time consumed by the group key establishment process, T gk , can be expressed as
where t DH is the overall time required to perform the actual DH calculations. One should note that the access and transmission times are expected to be in the order of milliseconds, while the DH related computations are in the order of seconds (shown for MICA2 motes in Malan et al. (2004) ). To that end, the fact that communications are done sequentially has little impact on the overall delay of the group key establishment process. It should be noted that the encryption/decryption functions performed at each node (when protecting the joint key K s ) consist of symmetric operations, which can be based on standard procedures like DES or AES. However, let us also consider the case where this operation is a simple exclusive-OR (XOR) operation between K s and K j+ . That is,
where c j is the ciphertext sent from N j to N j+1 . Node N j+1 then performs the following to propagate K s to N j+2 (note that N j and N j+1 share the same key K j+ , and N j+1 and N j+2 share K j+1− ),
As the nodes finally obtain K s , it is noted that all pairwise DH keys can also be known to the nodes in the group, by simply applying XOR to K s and all ciphertexts. A related question, which raises a strategic consideration, is what kind of a threat can be posed by this procedure. After all, if the members of the group finally know the joint secret key, K s , they might as well know the individual DH keys. This surely holds if the DH keys expire at the end of the session that utilizes the key K s .
Countering Possible Attacks
Several possible attacks, including Deny of Service (DoS) should be addressed. Two forms of DoS attacks can occur affecting the effectiveness of the offloading framework.
In the first type of DoS attacks, one or multiple malicious nodes, pretending to be nodes seeking assistance, can continuously send requests to neighbors to drain their energy when one or multiple malicious nodes keeps sending requests to neighbors to drain their energy and eventually disrupt the system. In these cases, the weight value generated at each node when receiving the request message can alleviate the DoS attack, as the more offload calculation a node receives, the more energy it will consume, and consequently, the longer the waiting time will be. This results in lower possibility of being served as the assistant node. The other type of DoS attacks can happen when the malicious nodes pretend to be the assisting nodes by always generating the highest weight value and thus always responding the quickest to request messages and can then return incorrect calculation results. In these cases, however, the key confirmation process is inherently able to counter it. After establishing the shared key, a key confirmation follows. That is, nodes N i and N j encrypt and decrypt a test message to verify that they have the same key. If indeed the keys are the same, both nodes can be trusted (i.e. each node can trust its counterpart). If The number of MIPS-years required to compute an Elliptic Curve logarithm.
it is clear that either one (or both) of the assisting nodes was malicious, or that there was an innocent error (for example due to link error). In both cases, if the key is not confirmed, then the joint key needs to be re-established. Under the scenario where a group key needs to be created, the two nodes that did not generate a joint key will be eliminated from the group.
CRYPTOCOMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Cryptocomplexity Analysis
The unique nature of WSNs merits a brief discussion on cryptocomplexity. Let the term MIPS denote million of instructions per second. We rely on the fact that a MIPS computer performs about 2 40 elliptic curve additions per year, which translates to approximately 80 iterations per second [Koblitz et al. (2000) ]. For a key of n bits, a rough estimation of the number of additions needed for solving an elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), is 2 n/2 . Relying on the latter, we present a cryptocomplexity summary of the key sizes discussed. Here we use 160-bit keys (over a field size of 163 bits) and 128 bit keys (over a field size of 131 bits). Table 3 provides approximations of the number of additions required to solve a single ECDLP, and the time it takes to perform such actions (in MIPS years). For comparison reasons, additional key sizes over different fields are also provided. l Recent challenges for solving the ECDLP over a field size of 109 have been issued [Certicom (1997) ]. In April 2004, the challenge was met and the ECDLP key was solved. The effort involved four months and 9,500 CPUs. In light of the fact that the time frame for the validity and confidentiality of WSN data is typically in the order of at most days, ECCbased key generation offers a high level of security.
Energy Consumption and Pairwise Key-establishment Time
We have implemented the presented key establishment procedures on a TPR 2400CA TelosB network sensor module [Crossbow (2005b) ], developed by the University of California, Berkeley, and manufactured by Crossbow, Inc. The TelosB platform's microcontroller unit is a 16-bit MSP430, an ultra low power controller manufactured by Texas Instruments, running at 8MHz and consuming 1.8mA. The transmission rate is 250 kbps, consuming 19.5mA when the radio is active. The unit draws a voltage of 3V. Two such motes were used in the experimental setup. One originated the request for key exchange, transmitting the necessary information to the other, while the other responded with the required. calculations and transmitted back the data. The same transmissions and calculations were symmetric with the second node as an initiator. For the purpose of calculating the energy consumptions, all metrics were measured both for transmitting and receiving data as well as for the computational component. The ECC key sizes used in our measurements were 131 bits and 163 bits. Their cryptographic complexity is, respectively, equivalent to that of 768-bit and 1024-bit RSA, as used in banking applications. Both these values are specified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Security Resource Center [E. Barker and Smid (2005) ].
The original code provided by Malan et al. [Malan et al. (2004) ], which was designed for the 8-bit MICA2 mote [Crossbow (2005a) ], was revised and optimized for TelosB implementation. Modifications to the code were carried out in order to exploit the 16-bit based operations supported by the MSP430. The revised code yielded execution of an ECC scalar-point multiplication in 18 seconds for 131-bit keys, and 32.5 seconds for 163-bit keys. Memory needs were at about 20Kbytes of ROM and 1500 bytes of RAM, for both the 163 and 131 bit cases. The energy consumption measurements are presented in Figure 4 . l Clearly, on the same key size, the energy consumed by radio transmission is three orders of magnitude lower than the energy consumed by calculating a scalar-point multiplication. That is, the transmission overhead is negligible compared to the computational efforts, strongly advocating the offloading approach pursued in this paper.
As indicated above, a node in a cluster needs to execute one exponentiation in order to perform both online fixed and ephemeral key-establishments (whereby in the latter, a second online calculation is offloaded to a neighboring node). Figure 5 summarizes the results obtained for both fixed and ephemeral key generations.
In the model considered, a node is either part of the cluster or an assisting node. Hence, assisting nodes do not take part in active information gathering and collaborative data processing. Moreover, a node will only assist a single other node at any given time. To that end, the overall gain achieved in the cluster by performing offloading for a single pair of nodes is linear with respect to the number of Figure 4 Energy consumption for scalar-point multiplication and radio transmission. Figure 5 Time computed for establishing an online pairwise fixed and ephemeral key. pair keys established.l Since using a smaller field size is certainly germane to WSN applications, the time consumed for these calculations can be further decreased.
Performance Gain Toward Network Lifetime
Next, we consider the implications of the offloading approach to the overall network lifetime. The latter is measured from the instant the network becomes active until the first node runs out of power. Although the offloading approach has proven to save computation time and energy consumption for a pair of nodes establishing the shared key, during the offloading process, extra communication energy is also inserted. Therefore, analyzing the offloading approach to the overall network performance and network lifetime is an appropriate performance metric. We shall refer to a simplified network model ( figure 6) to demonstrate the efficiency of the offloading approach affecting network lifetime. The model consists of two non-overlapping clusters of nodes, each of which has a cluster head. Let us assume that the two cluster heads exchange keys regularly as means of establishing secure links facilitating the exchange of confidential information. Let us further assume that each of the cluster heads is aided by a (possibly different) node, who is a member of the respective cluster. Since all nodes compute at least as much as the cluster heads, it is apparent that the network lifetime is determined by the lifetime of the head nodes. l
The TelosB platform is powered by two AA batteries in series operating nominally at 3V. The energy such batteries provide depends on their type and rated capacity. Typical Alkaline batteries offer approximately 2800 mAh for a 25mA discharge [Energizer (2005) ]. To that end, the total power they offer is: E B = 2, 800 mAh × 3V. Based on the timing and current discharge measurements summarized in figure 4 for 163-bit keys, the energy consumed in calculating a single exponentiation and transmitting a key is, respectively,
where t comp denotes the time it takes to perform the calculation, and t comm is the time it takes to transfer or receive the keys. This timing information is provided in figure 5 . In the case of no offloading, we have
since each node performs two exponentiations. However, when offloading is employed, the number of keys that can be generated is given by
since each node performs only one exponentiation, but is required to transmit and receive a message, each of which is identical to the length of a key. In order to derive a metric for the network lifetime, we shall assume that on average the application requires that η keys be generated The network lifetime per mWh as a function of the number of keys generated per hour. each hour. A reasonable value for η can be, for example, 12 which represents the scenario that on average every five minutes a new key is required. Consequently, the network lifetime for the case of no offloading is N 1 /η while for the case that offloading is utilized it is N 2 /η . Figure 7 depicts the network lifetime as a function of η for key sizes of 163 and 131 bits. It can be seen that the use of offloading almost doubles the network lifetime. Notably, it also reduces the computation time roughly by half since two nodes perform the required calculations in parallel. l 7 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK This paper adopted a recognized self-certified key establishment procedure for wireless sensor networks. The novelty of the approach concerns the partitioning of the key establishment process into secure and non-secure operations, and offloading the non-secure operations to assisting nodes. The self-certified property, along with the offloading protocol, yields a gain in execution speed and load-balancing of the power consumption across the network, thereby elongating the network lifetime. Scalability is offered both by the nature of the PKI foundations on which the proposed schemes rely, and by the linear increase in computational load with respect to the cluster size. Reliability is guaranteed as the authentication process inherently requires all nodes to successfully complete pairwise key confirmation.. The mathematical operations described are applicable to any finite group of points in which the discrete log problem applies. The presented framework can be utilized and broadened to address a wide range of security challenges in resource-constrained sensor networks.
Both fixed and ephemeral key establishments were treated. Encouraging results of ECC implementation were presented, strongly justifying an approach of preferring communication overhead over computational efforts.
Based on these foundations, a procedure for group key establishment within a cluster of nodes was presented, offering scalability with respect to network size and robustness.
As the described procedure relies on a cyclic exchange of information, future work will address the issue of fault tolerance. The notion of "fault" is two-fold. First, it relates to the question of how to guarantee that all the nodes within the cluster will be included in the chain without disconnections. Second, what happens when one or more nodes fail in the chain. Future work will concern the generation of redundant paths, while altogether minimizing the overall computational complexity. Moreover, the existence of malicious nodes (whether part of the cluster or assisting nodes) will be addressed to contribute to the robustness of the key establishment process while addressing the load balancing issue.
A question that naturally arises corresponds to the manner by which neighboring nodes are selected. We will study the joint effect of geographical distance between nodes and the remaining energy on the neighboring nodes in order to generate a fair selection. Although the communication time associated with the offloading process is much shorter than the DH key establishment time, the energy consumed during data transmission and reception is non-negligible. We will study the trade-offs between energy consumption and real-time key establishment in order to reach an optimal solution.
In this paper, we assume the sensor nodes are all static. However, the proposed scheme, in particular the ephemeral key-establishment methodology, has great potential in mobile sensor network applications, in which issues such as speed of mobility and key establishment turnaround time need to be evaluated.
